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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article we look at the possible relation between the IAS-IFRS, which promotes a present 
value, and earnings management enhanced by the application of these standards. The aim of this 
paper is to analyse the impact of the adoption of IAS-IFRS standards on the earnings 
manipulation used by managers to manipulate their earnings and other accounting information in 
order to keep the same image in front of investors and shareholders. 
 
We are expanding, to the French context, the problem of information content of the discretionary 
component of accounting income in connection with the application of IAS-IFRS since 2005. 
 
On the basis of a sample of 96 firms-year observations, selected from France, that adopted the 
IAS-IFRS since 2005, we studied the relationship of association between accounting variables the 
impact of the use of IAS-IFRS on discretionary accruals. In other words, we tried to analyse the 
advantages and disadvantages of the adoption of IAS-IFRS. 
 
The study results show that the manipulation of accounting information existed both before and 
after the adoption of IAS-IFRS. However, the application of IAS-IFRS accounting standards in 
France had less motivated managers to manipulate the accounting numbers to increase earnings. 
Infact, the degree of earnings management is higher before the adoption of IAS-IFRS (the 
manipulations were 22.06% of discretionary accruals after adoption of IAS-IFRS and 31.28% 
before). 
 
Keywords:  IAS-IFRS; Ratios; Dividend Yield; Accruals 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he financial statements published by companies to investors remain a source of insider information. 
Several empirical studies have shown the existence of an association between accounting variables 
and stock returns such as those of Daniel, Collins, & Kothari (1989), Lev & Thiagarajan (1993), 
Beaver et al. (1997), Kothari et al. (2003), and Bao (2004). In addition, some studies have shown the superiority of 
the explanatory power of accounting income on other accounting figures (Beaver et al., 1997; Kothari et al., 2003; 
Bao, 2004). Other studies are based on the usefulness and necessity of all the accounting variables issued by the 
firms. In fact, each variable has its own explanatory performance effect (Ali & Zarowin, 1992; Lev & Thiagarajan, 
1993; Chan & Seow, 1996; Kothari, 2001; Hung & Subramanyam, 2004). 
 
Some studies have shown that differences between national accounting systems affect the importance and 
credibility of accounting information (Hung, 2001; Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2000; Pope & Walker, 1999; 
Joos & Lang, 1994; Alford et al., 1993). 
 
T 
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The International Accounting Standards (IAS), now renamed as International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), have been developed to harmonize corporate accounting practice and to answer the need for high 
quality standards to be adopted in the world’s major capital markets. 
 
Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality 
information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. According to Gelard (1989), it is necessary to adopt an effective 
procedure. This should not be a compromise between systems often contradictory among themselves, but by a 
rational choice for the most effective way to reach the goal. He also noted that we must not ignore the international 
character of the IAS-IFRS that may negatively affect some environments. 
 
Other researchers agree that the global application of IAS-IFRS accounting standards would be difficult to 
achieve, even though that’s what investors are looking for (Chamber, 1976; Nobes, 1995; Hoarau, 1995). 
 
In addition, the IAS-IFRS are known by their flexibility. In fact, they enable managers to exercise their 
judgments to publish results based on discretionary targets (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, 1990). They seek their 
intervention to strengthen the information content of accounting figures in order to better inform the market about 
the prospects of the firm. According to Healy and Wahen (1999), the application of IAS-IFRS allows managers to 
exercise their discretion to adjust the financial statements based on circumstances and certain requirements. They 
believe that their intervention in the management of results increases the credibility of accounting information but 
also increases the level of discretionary accruals in the firm. 
 
Contrary to most published studies on the subject, in this article we look at the possible relation between 
the IAS-IFRS, which promotes a present value, and manipulation of accounting results enhanced by the application 
of these standards. 
 
In fact, in this paper we extend, to the French companies, the problem of information content of the 
discretionary component of accounting income in connection with the application of IAS-IFRS. A comparison of 
this context for Anglo-Saxon work is particularly interesting given the specificities of the French context. 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the merits of the change in accounting systems in France and to analyze 
the impact of this decision on the variation of the manipulation of accounting earnings under IAS-IFRS. We chose to 
compare the practices of performance management in different periods - pre-adoption (2003-2004) and post-
adoption (2006-2007). 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The accruals allow the principle of matching costs with revenues in calculating the earning of the current 
year. However, these accruals may become subject to manipulation and adjustment of net income by the 
management. Part of manipulated accruals is called the discretionary accruals. 
 
These adjustments can be made using different kinds of processes, referred to natural (Blanco et al., 2004; 
Heverals, 2007) and institutional (Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; Santella & Turrini, 2008). 
 
Copeland (1968) defined manipulation as an opportunity to increase or decrease the net income implicitly 
recognizing that the concept of manipulation extends to both maximizing, minimizing, smoothing results, and fraud 
financial; but the handling is not limited to income (Barnea et al., 1975; Ronen & Sadan, 1975; Barnea et al., 1976). 
They also include balance sheets and cash flow statements (Black et al., 1998). Given the multiplicity of forms of 
accounting manipulations, Stolowy & Breton (2003) included these forms under the name of "management 
accounting data" which they define as "the exploitation of the discretion left to the leader’s accounting policy choice 
or structuring transactions in order to generate a change in the risk of transfer of wealth associated with the 
company, as this risk is perceived in practice by the market." In practice, accounting manipulations combine 
practices which comply with the laws and standards from fraudulent practices. Academics often focus on the first 
where practitioners (including controllers) concentrate on the second (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). Thus, according to 
Schillit (1993), the "tricks" are actions or omissions to hide or conceal the actual financial performance or the 
financial health of a company. 
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Taking into account the discretionary component in the relationship between stock returns and accounting 
data in an environment using the IAS-IFRS is a relatively new problem and has become the subject of new research, 
especially after the last economic crisis. 
 
The reasons for earnings management are many and studies that have addressed this subject are important. 
However, we focus on studies linking the impact of the adoption of IAS-IFRS with the degree of these 
manipulations and their relationship with the other accounting variables. 
 
In their study, Ball et al. (2003) and Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) showed that the informational 
quality of accounting information depends on the degree of adaptation of accounting standards to the country's 
economic environment. Ashbaugh & Pincus (2001) went even further and concluded that the use of IFRS may 
increase or decline to publish the earnings, altering the information content of accounting and financial data. 
 
In the same current of ideas, Tort (2006.a, 2006.b, 2006.c, 2007) confirmed the existence of a contingency 
of the accounting policy of listed companies studied in the context of transition to IFRS-consolidated accounts. He 
added that these companies adopt different trading strategies to IFRS while integrating structural and external 
constraints in these strategies in order to adjust their accounting policy disclosure. He also confirmed the results of 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005). Stolowy and Breton (2003) considered that the transition to IFRS helps managing 
accounting data by corporations and, more specifically, gives access to the information of a consolidated balance 
sheet. For Santella and Turrini (2008), the distribution of dividends computed on the basis of IAS-IFRS may lead to 
unrealistic profits and unjust enrichment. Using these standards as the basis for accounting generates changes in the 
traditional accounting methods and mechanisms. Aussenegg et al. (2009) chose to study the level of earnings 
management by replacing the local GAAP with IAS-IFRS, for 15 European countries using a sample of over 18,000 
firms-years observations. 
 
In their study, Aussenegg et al. (2009) tested four hypotheses: 
 
1. Companies that adopted IAS-IFRS are not engaged in earning management more than those using local 
GAAP. 
2. Growing companies tend to engage more earnings management. 
3. Companies with significant cash flows have fewer earning management. 
4. Companies with significant financial power tend to have more earnings management. 
 
They include as independent variables, dummy variables for IAS/IFRS, the variable Time, the log of total 
assets to control for firm size effects, as well as three variables to test their hypotheses - revenue growth (in %), 
operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets (in %), and the debt/equity ratio. The coefficient of the IAS/IFRS-
dummy variable is still negative but, in contrast to the previous regression, not significant. This indicates that 
earnings management only tends to be significantly lower for IAS/IFRS firms compared to local GAAP firms in two 
regions (German law countries - Austria, Germany, and Switzerland - and three French law countries - Belgium, 
France, and the Netherlands). The remaining eleven countries do not show a significant decline in earnings 
management by applying IAS/IFRS standards. As mentioned above, this is especially true for the two Anglo-Saxon 
and the four Scandinavian countries. Again, they do not observe a significant time effect, nor a firm size effect. In 
contrast, there is a positive effect for revenue growth and the debt/equity ratio. 
 
Based on the use of discretionary accruals to stabilize the value of the outcome of the exercise, LaPointe et 
al. (2006) studied in the context of Switzerland, the effect of the use of accruals on the result set on the basis of IAS-
IFRS, US GAAP, and Swiss standards. Their study shows that Swiss firms use discretionary accruals to stabilize 
results. They add that the value of these results decreases when calculated on the basis of IAS-IFRS or U.S. GAAP. 
This shows that the adoption of IAS-IFRS accounting treatment negatively affects the handling of earnings. 
 
According to Lapointe et al. (2006), the structure of the accounting system of Switzerland is favorable to 
engage companies in earnings management. This system gives the Swiss companies the choice of measurement 
method and does not impose many rules and standards of substance (Achleitner, 1995; Raffournier, 1995). 
International standards allow companies to present users with more detailed information. To take advantage of the 
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transparency and quality of this information, the Swiss financial market requires listed companies to publish 
financial statements prepared on the basis of IAS-IFRS. The purpose of this recommendation is to maintain the 
confidence of investors and shareholders who find it difficult to have information that assists them in making their 
decisions when financial statements are prepared on the basis of Swiss GAAP. 
 
Using the approach of the information content, Wang and Williams (1994), Michelson et al. (1995), and 
Subramanyam (1996) showed that there is a relationship of positive association between income stability and stock 
returns. Using the approach of the relevance of accounting results, Habib (2004) found that the stability of income 
contributes to the decline in relevance. 
 
According to Healy and Wahen (1999), the application of IAS-IFRS allows managers to exercise their 
discretion to adjust the financial statements based on circumstances and certain requirements. They believe that their 
intervention in earnings management increases the credibility of accounting information but also increases the level 
of discretionary accruals in the firm. Christensen et al. (2008) argue that firms’ orientation to external - versus 
internal - financing affects their incentives to adopt IAS/IFRS early and to be more transparent (less earnings 
management) in their reporting. Early adoption of IFRS and a commitment to greater transparency reflects a trade-
off for managers of losing their informational advantage over external parties to the firm versus the benefits from 
being able to attract external financing to exploit growth opportunities. These arguments lead Christensen et al. to 
predict that firms with greater insider orientation will be less likely to adopt IFRS early. Consistent with this 
prediction, they find that firms that delayed adoption (resisters) have more bank ownership (where information 
asymmetries are resolved through private channels), higher long-term leverage, less often equity issue, and have a 
higher proportion of shares that are closely held. They also find that firms that delayed IAS-IFRS adoption make 
less financial analysis, suggesting these firms face less demand for transparent information from the capital markets. 
Christensen et al. (2008) analyze a sample of 310 German firms that adopted IAS-IFRS from 1998 to 2005. They 
compare earnings management (smoothing) metrics of early adopters (pre-2005) to late adopters (2005). They find a 
decrease in earnings management for the early adopters but a modest increase in earnings management (smoothing) 
for those firms that waited until IAS-IFRS became mandatory in Germany. They attribute these differences in results 
to early adopters’ incentives to adopt IAS-IFRS in order to improve their earnings quality. 
 
Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski (2006) identified the main difficulties as 1) the complex nature of 
IAS-IFRS, 2) the lack of IAS/IFRS implementation guidance, and 3) the lack of uniform interpretation of IAS-IFRS. 
To the extent that these newly adopted accounting standards (IFRS after 2005) allow management greater flexibility 
in reporting earnings, we predict they will lead to greater earnings management (smoothing). Minimizing the cost of 
financing is an important motivation of financial manipulations. In the case of a capital increase, it is common to 
discover manipulation statements (Broye & Schatt, 2002). Similarly, the reduction of the cost of capital (equity or 
debt), by applying a policy of smoothing results, can display a lower level of business risk (Stolowy & Breton, 
2003). From this literature, we can formulate the following assumptions: 
 
H1: The use of discretionary accruals is associated with the value of debt and customers in French companies. 
H1a: The use of discretionary accruals is associated with the value of debt and customers before the adoption of 
IAS-IFRS. 
H1b: The use of discretionary accruals is associated with the value of debt and customers following the adoption 
of IAS-IFRS. 
H2: The use of discretionary accruals is associated with the value of equity and yield. 
H2a: The use of discretionary accruals is associated with equity value and yield prior to the adoption of IAS-
IFRS. 
H2b: The use of discretionary accruals is associated with the value of equity and yield after the adoption of IAS-
IFRS. 
H3: The adoption of IAS-IFRS helps to decrease earnings management. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Background and Sample 
 
In this research, we selected a sample of 96 companies’ year observations based on the French business 
firms (CAC 40) which adopted the IAS-IFRS since 2005. To study the impact of adoption on the manipulation of 
accounting figures, we chose two study periods - 2003-2004 prior to the adoption and 2006-2007after the adoption. 
The results obtained from both periods will be compared. We try to analyze the correlation relationship between 
discretionary accruals and accounting and financial data published by the French firms before and after the adoption 
of IAS-IFRS. We eliminated the financial companies and other enterprises with sector-based accounting rules. Our 
choice of the period from 2004 to 2007 is justified by the entry into application of IAS-IFRS by French firms. 
 
3.2 Variable of the Study 
 
3.2.1 Accounting and Financial Variables 
 
The accounting and financial information were collected annually from French CAC 40 companies’ 
websites and we were able to distribute transactions over the four financial years’ (2003, 2004, 2006, and 2007) 
objects of study, in two sets. The first set, related to the cyclical or current operation, can isolate single concepts 
related to business activity - turnover, value added, operating surplus, and operating resources. The second, which 
considers aggregate behaviour, takes into account not only the operating functions, but other functions related to 
external growth, portfolio management, debts, and cash management, etc. This allows the study of different ratios 
related to the financial structure, margins and overall income and financing. 
 
Among these ratios, 10 were selected in our study. They are the key points of the analysis made by 
financial analysts Baccouche and Nafti (2007) at the introduction of the company to the stock market or after its 
introduction. 
 
The yield per share for a period of time t can be expressed as follows: 
 
    
                        
   
 
 
Pit is the value of investment at beginning of the period. 
Pit+1 is the value of this investment at end of the period. 
Dit is dividends paid during the period. 
datt Represents the rights of attribution. 
dsous Represents the rights of subscription. 
 
3.2.2. Discretionary Accruals 
 
The measure of the degree of performance management used in our study is the value of discretionary 
accruals (DA). The estimation of discretionary accruals will be realized based on the model of Jones (1991) and on 
the model of Subramanyam (1996). However, to estimate discretionary accruals, one must first determine the total 
amount of accruals for each firm and each year. Due to lack of financial data for the application of the approach 
based on the balance sheet, we will use the cash flow approach to calculate total accruals in accordance with 
JeanJean’s (2001) research. 
 
The total accruals (TAit) are calculated as the difference between the net result of a year (NRit) and cash 
flows generated by the activity of the company during the same period (CFEit). Thus: 
 
TAit = RNit - CFEit 
 
with 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2014 Volume 30, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1244 The Clute Institute 
TAit is the total accruals of the firm i in year t. 
RNit is the earnings of the firm i in year t. 
CFEit is the operations cash flow of the firm i in year t. 
 
The total accruals (TAit) can also be written as follow: 
 
TAit = DAit + NDAit 
 
with 
 
TAit: the total accruals for the firm i in year t 
DAit: the discretionary accruals of the firm i in year t 
NDAit: the non-discretionary accruals of the firm i in year t 
 
The modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) is: 
 
TAit/Ait-1 = α1 (1/Ait-1) + α 2 ((ΔCAit - ΔCREit)/Ait-1) + α 3 (IMMOit/Ait-1) + εit 
 
with 
 
TAit: total accruals in period t for firm i 
ΔCAit: change in turnover between t and t-1 for firm i 
ΔCREit: change in receivables between t and t-1 for firm i 
IMMOit: gross non-financial fixed assets in year t for firm i 
Ait-1: Total Assets at end of period t-1 for firm i 
 
3.3 Models of Accruals and Accounting Variables 
 
The multivariate analysis is used to estimate the coefficients of the regression model. First, this model 
allows us to demonstrate the association relationship between accounting variables (based on the IAS-IFRS) and 
discretionary accruals (DA). Second, it can analyze the same relationship between the accounting variables (based 
on local GAAP) and discretionary accruals. 
 
DAit = 0 + 1 RES_NET/CA + 2 RES_NET/CAP + 3 CA/IMMO + 4 PNC/CAP + 5 CAP/IMMO +  
6 PNC/RES NET + 7 CA/CAP + 8 CA/CLI+ 9 DIV + 10 REND + i + t 
 
with 
 
DAit: discretionary accruals (in absolute value) 
i: represents the specific effects of companies 
t: represents the error term 
 
The accounting variables are detailed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Selected Accounting Variables 
Variables Nature of Each Variable 
V1 Earnings / Turnover (Performance) 
V2 Earnings / Equity 
V3 Turnover / Fixed Assets (Assets Turnover) 
V4 Non-Current Liabilities / Equity 
V5 Equity / Net Fixed Assets 
V6 Non-Current Liabilities / Earnings 
V7 Turnover / Equity (Equity Turnover) 
V8 Turnover / Customers (Customers Turnover) 
V9 Dividend per Share 
V10 Yield 
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4. STUDY RESULTS 
 
The objective of our study is to examine the appropriateness of changes in accounting systems in France. It 
is also to analyze the impact of these decisions on the change in earnings manipulations in the context of IAS-IFRS. 
To analyze this impact, we have tried to find an association relationship between discretionary accruals and 
accounting variables in the French context before and after the adoption of IAS-IFRS. 
 
4.1 Before the Adoption of the IAS-IFRS 
 
The examination of the correlation matrix (Appendix 1) allows us to conclude the absence of 
mutlicolinearity for all the variables. In fact, according to Kennedy (1992), multicollinearity in a data set is 
considered if at least one simple correlation coefficient between the independent variables is at least 0.8. The results 
presented in Table 2 are obtained through estimates based on the fixed effect model (OLS) since the null hypothesis 
for the Hausman test is rejected (chi2 = 2.65 and Prob > chi2 = 0.97). 
 
The coefficients of the variables V4 and V8 are significant and negative (-0.066 and -0.03, respectively). 
They explain the variation in discretionary accruals in respect of 31.43%. 
 
These variables are balance and profitability ratios. They allow investors to have a clear idea about the 
percentage of firm debt (V4) and its ability to meet its long-term commitments and customer turnover (V8). This 
result shows that French firms, before the adoption of IAS-IFRS, manipulate downward the value of long-term debt 
and increased the value of bad debt provisions due to the credit sales policy followed by the companies. These 
operations are of the order of 31.43% discretionary accruals. Thus, the flexibility of the French national standards 
enables managers to exercise their judgment to publish results based on discretionary objectives (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986, 1990). 
 
Table 2: Regression Results of DA to Accounting Variables (2003-2004) 
Model A: DAit = 0 + 1 V1 + 2 V2 + 3 V3 + 4 V4 + 5 V5 + 6 V6 + 7 V7 + 8 V8 + 9 V9 + 10 V10 + i + t 
 Parameter Estimate t Probability > | T | 
Constant 0,0776 0,97 0,331 
V1 -0,1848 -0,48 0,634 
V2 0,3154 1,13 0,4726 
V3 -0,1040 -0,72 0,47 
V4 -0,0663 -3,17 0,002
* 
V5 0,0077 0,2 0,843 
V6 0,0001 0,08 0,938 
V7 0,024 1,28 0,201 
V8 -0,03 -2,59 0,01
* 
V9 0,0074 0,12 0,903 
V10 1,0827 1,44 0,151 
Adjusted R²: 31,43% 
Significant at: * 1%, ** 5% and *** 10% (***) 
 
According to Lapointe et al. (2006), the structure of the accounting system of Switzerland (national system 
like the French one) is favorable to engage companies in earnings management. This system gives the Swiss 
companies the choice of measurement method and does not impose many rules and standards of substance 
(Achleitner, 1995; Raffournier, 1995). 
 
International standards allow companies to publish more detailed information than the Swiss GAAP. To 
take advantage of the transparency and quality of this information, the Swiss financial market requires listed 
companies to publish financial statements prepared on the basis of IAS-IFRS. International standards allow 
companies to publish more detailed information than the Swiss GAAP. In fact, to take advantage of the transparency 
and quality of this information, the Swiss financial market made mandatory for listed companies to publish financial 
statements prepared on the basis of IAS-IFRS. Furthermore, investors and shareholders consider that information 
contained in the financial statements prepared on the basis of Swiss GAAP as insufficient for decision-making. 
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In addition, Aussenegg et al. (2009) show that countries belonging to the German legal system and some 
countries belonging to the French legal system experience a significant decline in performance management of their 
businesses compared to their counterparts that use local GAAP. They do observe neither a significant time effect nor 
a firm size effect. In contrast, there is a positive effect for revenue growth and the debt/equity ratio. Consequently, 
H1a is verified. 
 
Although the results of Model A show the magnitude of the coefficients of two variables in the variability 
of accruals, it is not acceptable to ignore the other variables in the model. Indeed, despite that the significance of 
their coefficient is low, we cannot rule out the model. 
 
At this stage of the analysis, we need to eliminate the three variables with the lowest coefficient to identify 
hidden effects between other variables and accruals relations. These variables are V5, V6, and V9. We obtained the 
results presented in Table 3. 
 
We note that the results of our regression changed. In addition to the two variables that are significant in 
Model A, two other variables are also significant in the Model B. Indeed, the coefficients of the variables V7 and V10 
are significant and positive (0.022 and 1.104, respectively). These two variables measure, respectively, the equity 
turnover and economic efficiency. 
 
Variable V7 allows us to appreciate how managers use the assets. This ratio is low (< 1) in the areas that 
require heavy investment and it is generally high (> 1) in the service sector. This ratio is important to our results. In 
fact, we can conclude that French firms, before the adoption of IAS-IFRS, invest significant resources to acquire 
assets and keep up with technology in order to attract investors and to maintain its image and reputation for the 
stakeholders. Our results enable us to conclude that the more the company is profitable (V10), the more it can 
practice earnings management. These manipulations are 31.28% of discretionary accruals. Hence, H2a is verified. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results of DA to the Remaining Accounting Variables (2003-2004) 
Model B: DAit = 0 + 1 V1 + 2 V2 + 3 V3 + 4 V4 + 5 V7 +6 V8+ 7 V10 + i + t 
 Parameter Estimate t Probability > | T | 
Constant 0,089 1,53 0,126 
V1 -0,189 -0,52 0,601 
V2 0,3145 1,27 0,203 
V3 -0,008 -1,07 0,283 
V4 -0,068 -4,34 0,000
* 
V7 0,022 1,74 0,081
** 
V8 -0,029 -3,04 0,002
* 
V10 1,104 1,56 0,1
*** 
Adjusted R²: 31,28% 
Significant at: * 1%, ** 5% and *** 10% (***) 
 
4.2 After the Adoption of the IAS-IFRS 
 
This part of the analysis allows us to test the degree of accounting manipulation after the adoption of IAS-
IFRS by French firms. Using the same approach than before the adoption of the IAS-IFRS, the examination of the 
correlation matrix (Appendix 2) allows us to conclude the absence of multicolinearity for all the variables since the 
largest correlation coefficient in Appendix 2 is less than .8. 
 
The results of Model C (Table 4) show that the coefficients of the variables V4 and V7 are significant with 
different signs (-0.3388 and 0.3083, respectively). French companies continue to handle their debts down even after 
the adoption of IAS-IFRS. They also follow the same policy of managing their resources to keep their brand and 
their investors. However, we note that these manipulations are of 22.19% discretionary accruals instead of 31.43% 
(Model A). 
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Table 4: Regression Results of DA to Accounting Variables (2006-2007) 
Model C: DAit = 0 + 1 V1 + 2 V2 + 3 V3 + 4 V4 + 5 V5 + 6 V6 + 7 V7 + 8 V8 + 9 V9 + 10 V10 + i + t 
 Parameter Estimate t Probability > | T | 
Constant 0.2096539 0.95 0.355 
V1 0.0565389 0.61 0.549 
V2 -0.3616447 -0.49 0.633 
V3 -0.0927982 -0.46 0.653 
V4 -0.3388485 -1.98 0.063
** 
V5 0.0987203 0.41 0.688 
V6 0 .0013188 0.46 0.653 
V7 0.3083014 1.71 0.10
*** 
V8 -0.1238324 -1.40 0.177 
V9 -0.0115302 -0.37 0.717 
V10 0.7176448 0.52 0.608 
Adjusted R²: 22,19% 
Significant at: * 1%, ** 5% and *** 10% (***) 
 
In addition, the elimination of some variables, whose correlation coefficient is not significant, helped 
slightly to obtain better results (Table 5). Indeed, the elimination of variables V2, V3, and V5, allowed the coefficient 
of the variable V8 to be negative and significant (-0.142). This result confirms the ones of Models A and B. 
However, we note that these manipulations are 21.06% of discretionary accruals instead of 31.28% (Model B). 
Consequently, H1b and H2b are verified. 
 
Table 5: Regression Results of DA to the Remaining Accounting Variables (2006-2007) 
Model D: DAit = 0 + 1 V1 + 2 V4 + 3 V6 + 4 V7 + 5 V8 + 6 V9 + 7 V10 + i + t 
 Parameter Estimate t Probability > | T | 
Constant 0.1913235 1.11 0.278 
V1 0.0232947 0.43 0.674 
V4 -0.2943056 -2.29 0.032
** 
V6 0.0015555 0.78 0.445 
V7 0.2590664 2.07 0.051
** 
V8 -0.1427198 -2.01 0.057
** 
V9 -0.0154701 -0.57 0.576 
V10 0.8062302 0.64 0.529 
Adjusted R²: 21,06% 
Significant at: * 1%, ** 5% and *** 10% (***) 
 
4.3 Summary of Results 
 
The results of our study (Table 6) show clearly that the manipulation of accounting figures exist before and 
after the adoption of IAS-IFRS. However, the adoption of international standards has helped to reduce the extent of 
this manipulation (31.28% to 21.06%). Two reasons for this phenomenon are: 
 
 Selected years 2006-2007 in our study provide the first two years after the adoption. It is a difficult 
transition for companies that need to develop a different traditional informational and accounting system, 
train their staff, and understand more prerogatives and benefits of this change. Therefore, managers show a 
certain distrust and caution in applying new and unfamiliar accounting policies. 
 Some studies Nafti et al. (2013), Kothari et al. (2003), Mariam & Jaques (2007), Bao (2004), and Aboody 
et al. (1999) have shown that the adoption of IAS-IFRS has a positive impact on earnings. Managers are 
then less motivated to manipulate their accounting numbers to increase earnings. They have been an 
automatic increase after the application of the fair value method. 
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Table 6: Before and After IAS-IFRS Results Summary 
ADit = 0 + 1 V1 + 2 V2 + 3 V3 + 4 V4 + 5 V5 + 6 V6 + 7 V7 + 8 V8 + 9 V9 + 10 V10 + i + t 
 Before IAS-IFRS Adoption After IAS-IFRS Adoption 
V1   
V2   
V3   
V4 X X 
V5   
V6   
V7 X X 
V8 X X 
V9   
V10 X  
Adjusted R² 31,28% 21,06% 
 
Based on a sample of 353 French-listed groups relating to the period 2003-2006, the results of the paper of 
Zeghal et al. (2011) show that the mandatory adoption of IAS-IFRS is associated with a reduction in earnings level 
management. In addition, according to Zeghal et al. (2011), “the independence and the efficiency of the board of 
directors, the existence of an independent audit committee, the existence of block shareholders, the quality of the 
external audit and the listing on foreign financial markets are important for enforcement of IAS-IFRS in France. 
Mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS has decreased earnings management level for companies with good corporate 
governance and those who depend on foreign financial markets.” Thus, H3 is verified. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The IASB has established international standards (IAS-IFRS) to ensure more comparability and 
transparency, as well as better quality of financial statements. The establishment of such standards by the IASB aims 
at achieving harmonization of accounting practices between countries. 
 
Some studies have shown that differences between national accounting systems affect the importance and 
credibility of accounting information (Hung, 2001; Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2000; Pope & Walker, 1999; 
Joos & Lang, 1994; Alford et al., 1993). This flexibility allows managers to exercise their decision to publish 
earnings based on discretionary targets (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, 1990). They seek their intervention to 
strengthen the information content of accounting figures in order to better inform the market about the prospects of 
the firm. 
 
In this article, we are interested in the relationship that may exist between the IAS-IFRS, which promotes a 
present value, and the manipulation of earnings enhanced by the application of these standards. We are expanding, 
to the French context, the problem of information content of the discretionary component of accounting earnings in 
connection with the application of IAS-IFRS. 
 
On the basis of a sample of 96 firms-year observations from France, which adopts the IAS-IFRS since 
2005, we studied the impact of the use of IAS-IFRS on discretionary accruals in this relationship. The study results 
show that the application of IAS-IFRS accounting standards in France had less motivated managers to manipulate 
their accounting numbers to increase earnings. In fact, the degree of earnings management is higher before the 
adoption of IAS-IFRS (the manipulations were 22.06% of discretionary accruals after adoption of IAS-IFRS and 
31.28% before). 
 
We can say that before the adoption of IAS-IFRS, French firms manipulated downward the value of long-
term debt and increased the value of bad debt provisions due to the credit sales policy followed by the companies. 
We can also conclude that French firms, before the adoption of IAS-IFRS, invest significant resources to acquire 
property and keep up with technology in order to attract investors and keep its brand image and reputation against 
the partners and shareholders. Finally, our findings allow us to conclude that when the company is more profitable 
(REND), it can practice more earnings management. 
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In addition, we can also conclude that, after the adoption of IAS-IFRS, the French companies continue to 
manipulate their accounting numbers by reducing their debts and increasing their provisions but at a lower degree 
than before the adoption. We also notice that REND, which is the variable measuring the performance of the firm, is 
not significant after the adoption. This result can be explained by the fact that the performance is much related to the 
current value. The French companies had better performance after the adoption than before because of their updated 
financial statements. Finally, our results confirm those of Zeghal et al. (2011) and Aussenegg et al. (2009). 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Correlation Matrix before IAS-IFRS Adoption 
Variables AD RES_NET/CA RES_NET/CAP CA/IMMO PNC/CAP CAP/IMMO PNC/RES_NET CA/CAP CA/CLI DIV REND 
AD 1.000           
RES 
NET/CA 
0.0684 1.000          
RES 
NET/CAP 
0.0507 0.4944 1.000         
CA/IMMO -0.1164 -0.1194 0.4068 1.000        
PNC/CAP -0.2719 -0.3376 0.1948 -0.1111 1.000       
CAP/IMMO -0.0066 0.3474 0.0923 0.5737 -0.7078 1.000      
PNC/RES 
NET 
-0.1473 -0.2916 -0.1143 -0.1950 0.6984 -0.5252 1.000     
CA/CAP -0.0622 -0.5617 0.3530 0.5065 0.5866 -0.3260 0.3012 1.000    
CA/CLI -0.3437 0.0946 0.2626 0.2214 0.1144 -0.0230 -0.0551 0.2356 1.000   
DIV -0.0208 0.1179 0.2289 0.1179 -0.0208 -0.0486 -0.1318 0.0763 0.2151 1.000  
REND 0.1349 0.2058 0.2515 -0.1061 0.2091 -0.2658 0.1427 0.0504 0.0987 0.1897 1.000 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix after IAS-IFRS Adoption 
Variables AD RES_NET/CA RES_NET/CAP CA/IMMO PNC/CAP CAP/IMMO PNC/RES_NET CA/CAP CA/CLI DIV REND 
AD 1.000           
RES 
NET/CA 
-0.175 1.000          
RES 
NET/CAP 
-0.234 0.506 1.000         
CA/IMMO -0.217 -0.463 -0.027 1.000        
PNC/CAP -0.078 -0.24 0.2 -0.228 1.000       
CAP/IMMO 0.1523 0.008 -0.232 0.6 -0.76 1.000      
PNC/RES 
NET 
0.1937 -0.35 -0.244 -0.11 0.611 -0.497 1.000     
CA/CAP -0.08 0.484 0.356 0.485 0.475 -0.31 0.257 1.000    
CA/CLI -0.36 0.1724 0.525 -0.075 0.04 -0.23 -0.247 0.268 1.000   
DIV -0.25 0.3533 0.191 -0.297 0.061 -0.31 -0.065 -0.075 0.273 1.000  
REND 0.266 -0.228 -0.176 0.3785 0.07 0.218 -0.015 0.14 -0.3184 -0.036 1.000 
 
